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Introduction 
The rise of zero-tolerance policies in many states and school districts has 
had the effect of stiffening the penalties mandated for students who violate 
school rules and, in some cases, of imposing criminal penalties on 
offenses that were previously treated as school disciplinary matters.1,2 
Additionally, the advent of zero-tolerance policies has coincided with many 
schools and districts adopting strict security measures, including the 
installation of metal detectors and surveillance cameras and the 
deployment of armed security personnel, all for the purpose of enhancing 
security.3-5 
Critics of zero-tolerance policies have pointed out that by narrowly 
focusing on security many schools have ignored some of the services and 
school conditions that are essential to academic achievement, student 
well-being, and school safety.1-3,5,6 For example, in many districts, as 
funding for security measures has increased, funding for guidance 
counselors, social workers, and school psychologists has decreased.3,4 In 
many cases, school security efforts have been launched in isolation of 
broader measures that have been shown to have a positive impact on the 
academic performance of students and the overall effectiveness of 
schools.  
In this paper, we utilize the case of Seacrest High School, a large 
urban school that experienced violent conflicts between Asian and black 
students during the 2009-2010 academic year. We use the case to 
demonstrate how a preoccupation with school safety led to other 
dimensions of school success being ignored. Under the glare of 
considerable media scrutiny as a result of the incident and a subsequent 
court order that required the school district to take actions to ensure the 
safety of students, the district adopted a singular focus on safety and 
security that resulted in the neglect of academic engagement and school 
culture. As we show through our analysis of the case, the narrow focus on 
security undermined the effectiveness of the costly measures that were 
adopted and prevented educators from taking actions to address the 
overall quality of the educational environment.  
We use this case study analysis to make the point that any attempt 
to narrow the measure of school success to a singular outcome (in this 
case safety) will result in a fragmented approach to school improvement 
and lead to other important dimensions of education (e.g., content 
knowledge, critical thinking skills, social-emotional support for students, 
moral reasoning, civic engagement, and creating equity among students 
of different races/classes) being ignored. The data from this case will also 
reveal what the constituents of Seacrest felt was neglected as a result of 
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the school’s focus on security. The central question we explore is: What 
were the educational and social consequences of an expanded and 
intensified regime of policies aimed at improving school safety?  
 
Background 
Seacrest High School is located in a large city in the United States. 
Although overseen by one administrative team, the school is divided into 
academies: a 9th grade academy, three themed 10th through 12th grade 
academies, and a program geared toward recent immigrants, most of 
whom are English language learners (ELLs). Each academy is located 
within a section of the building to allow for some degree of programmatic 
autonomy and separation, although there are no official markers or 
barriers between the academies. All of the academies share the 
gymnasium, auditorium, library, and cafeteria, as well as Seacrest’s 
support staff of counselors, after-school program providers, and security 
officers. 
According to school data reports, the student body of Seacrest High 
School is quite diverse. Of the total school population, 51% self-identify as 
black or African American, 28% self-identify as Asian (this includes 
students from several different countries within Asia), 10% identify as 
Hispanic/Latino, and the remainder come from a variety of backgrounds 
and nationalities. There are more than 12 languages represented among 
the student body, and only 47.7% of the student body’s first home 
language is English. After English, Chinese is the most widely spoken 
home language, followed by Vietnamese, Spanish, Khmer, and Nepali. 
Only 9% of the ELL students are black, and most of these students are 
recent African immigrants. Seventy-three percent of the ELL students self-
identify as Asian. Throughout this paper, when we refer to ELL and black 
students, we largely mean Asian ELL students and non-ELL, US-born 
black students respectively, since these are the two largest groups in the 
school. 
Because of the large number of immigrant and ELL students, 
Seacrest High School offers a variety of services and programs to meet 
the language and social needs of this student population. In keeping with 
the academy structure of the school, these services and the entire 
academic program for ELL students have been housed on one floor of the 
school. In practical terms, this means that most of the Asian students in 
the school are physically separated from the black students. While the 
students do share common spaces within the school—the cafeteria, gym, 
auditorium, etc.—they are isolated from each other during most of their 
time at Seacrest.  
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The Incident 
Although Seacrest High School had been classified since 2007 as 
“persistently dangerous” under No Child Left Behind (NCLB)i, a conflict 
erupted between Asian and black students at the end of 2009 that brought 
heightened attention to the school’s level of safety. Though accounts of 
the incident vary, an independent investigation found that there were 
actually a series of incidents on and outside school grounds over 2 days. 
On the first day, small groups of mostly Vietnamese and black students 
fought during and after school. The next day, the conflict escalated with 
several black students attacking about thirty Asian students in the 
hallways of Seacrest. Several Asian students were again targeted as they 
walked home. Many of the Asian students who were attacked on the 
second day had not been involved in the initial conflict. Some Asian 
students were injured quite severely during these attacks and required 
medical attention. According to police reports, the black students involved 
were primarily 9th and 10th graders, and most of the Asian students who 
were targeted had been in the US for less than one year. Despite these 
patterns, some victims and witnesses reported that there were white and 
Cambodian students among the assailants. Nonetheless, the media 
portrayed the incident as an interracial conflict between Asian and black 
students.  
 Following the incident, the students identified as assailants were 
removed from the school; however, many Asian students reported they 
still felt unsafe at Seacrest and began an official boycott of the school with 
the support of parents and community groups. The principal and 
superintendent attempted to downplay the significance of the incident and 
reported to the media that the school was safe. Finally, after 3 weeks of 
the boycott by dozens of Asian students, the superintendent reported that 
the principal would be replaced and several security measures would be 
enacted to ensure that there would be no recurrence of violence.  
Subsequently, the school took measures to increase surveillance 
and policing. Additional security cameras were added to the hallways and 
stairwells. The number of security officers was increased from 2 to 15, and 
some officers were transferred if their response on the days of the attacks 
was perceived as inadequate or inappropriate. Efforts were made to 
                                                          
iAlthough the federal NCLB legislation requires states to designate schools as 
“persistently dangerous,” it is up to each state to develop a definition of this label and to 
give it to schools as it sees necessary. NCLB requires that parents at a “persistently 
dangerous” school are informed that they can enroll their children at a different school. 
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clearly inform the student body about procedures for reporting incidents 
and the consequences of bullying and fighting.  
In response to requests by community groups, the incident was 
investigated by the State Board of Human Relations and the US 
Department of Justice. These investigations resulted in the enactment of a 
consent decree between the school district, the state, and the US 
Department of Justice. The consent decree required the district to appoint 
an outside monitor who would be responsible for overseeing the variety of 




Research on inter-group student conflict can be traced back to the influx of 
Eastern and Southern European immigrants at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Education scholars felt that inter-ethnic conflict and competition 
between immigrant groups distinguished by linguistic, religious, and/or 
cultural differences posed a threat to social cohesion at the local and 
national levels. Schools were regarded as the primary institution charged 
with socializing new immigrants and forging a common culture through 
assimilation. Over time, scholars believed that assimilation would lead to a 
reduction in conflict between ethnic groups.7  
Concerns with intergroup student conflict emerged again with the 
advent of desegregation in the 1960s and 1970s, as black students began 
enrolling in white-majority schools. Scholars, such as sociologist Gordon 
W. Allport,8 developed the contact hypothesis to explain the patterns of 
interracial conflict within schools and communities. According to this 
theory, following an initial period of intense conflict, there would be a 
gradual reduction of tension as groups improved their ability to 
communicate. For Allport, this was most likely to occur under conditions of 
equal status, as groups pursued common goals and as opportunities to 
develop informal relationships increased through everyday interactions 
and other forms of cooperation.8 Interracial conflict in schools was 
understood as stemming from a lack of exposure, awareness, and 
understanding.9 In response, researchers and practitioners developed 
multicultural curricula, facilitated interracial dialogue, and implemented 
programs to bring youth together within the structure of planned activities.9 
Although later research nuanced the contact hypothesis by delineating the 
particular demographic or institutional factors that explain why intergroup 
interaction is more or less successful in different cases,10 the contact 
hypothesis is still a powerful and pervasive paradigm employed in 
responses to interracial conflict. 
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 Since the 1980s, research concerned with interracial conflict in 
schools has waned. This may be due in part to the decrease in efforts to 
promote racial integration since the late 1970s.11 It may also be because 
integration and interracial conflict have been largely explored along the 
black-white binary, and white students have become increasingly isolated 
in majority-white schools. This focus has left the relationships between 
communities of color within schools devoid of white students largely 
underexplored. In one of the few studies that makes a particular effort to 
broaden the study of interracial conflict to minority groups other than 
blacks, Kiang and Kaplan12 illuminate the voices of Vietnamese students 
in the context of a black-white interracial conflict in a Boston high school. 
They demonstrate that while the Vietnamese students were not directly 
involved in the conflict at their school, its effects greatly influenced the 
Vietnamese students’ schooling experiences. Additional research that 
explores the roots of interracial/ethnic conflict and effective interventions 
for minority-minority conflict is needed, especially as schools with few 
white students continue to become more numerous, increasingly isolated, 
and internally diverse.  
Although research on interracial conflict at school is limited, 
education literature has often drawn distinctions between immigrant and 
black American students that may serve as a useful foundation for 
exploring minority-minority conflict. Most notably, anthropologist John 
Ogbu13 distinguished between voluntary immigrants, such as Chinese and 
Indian immigrants, and non-voluntary immigrants, such as American 
Indians, Puerto Ricans, and blacks, in the United States. Ogbu posited 
that non-voluntary immigrants perform worse in public US schools and are 
more likely to exhibit oppositional behavior because they equate schooling 
with a form of cultural oppression. In contrast, he suggested that voluntary 
immigrants are more likely to be motivated to embrace schooling and to 
exhibit a high tolerance for discrimination because they regard 
assimilation as the necessary requirement for social mobility. Unfamiliar 
with the dominant US culture, they are often oblivious to manifestations of 
racism, xenophobia, and classism, or they excuse them as matters of 
cultural difference. Although this historical-cultural approach to explaining 
the academic differences between immigrant and black students fails to 
account for variation within groups, it is somewhat helpful for drawing 
attention to the often disparate academic experiences of black and 
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Zero-Tolerance Policies and Responses to Interracial Conflict 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, schools began to adopt and expand the 
“zero-tolerance” disciplinary and policing practices that were becoming 
common in the adult criminal justice system.1,3-5,14,15 This shift not only 
mirrored paradigm changes in governance and the criminal justice 
system,16,17 but it also reflected a trend toward narrowing the responsibility 
of teachers to curricular concerns, leaving behavior and discipline to out-
of-classroom specialists and security agents.1,2 In 1994, President Clinton 
signed into law the Gun-Free Schools Act, which mandated a 1-year 
suspension for any student who brought a gun to school. This policy 
served as the basis for a broader regime of zero-tolerance policies in 
which a range of subjective and objective disciplinary infractions were to 
be addressed by harsh and exclusionary sanctions.4,5 These changes 
were accelerated by highly publicized violent school incidents, such as the 
Columbine shootings.4 The media created the impression that schools 
were in a state of crisis and suffering from an unprecedented epidemic of 
violence—an image that incited fear and lent support to the expansion of 
zero-tolerance policies.18,19 
 Zero-tolerance policies are characterized by the frequent use of 
exclusionary sanctions, such as suspension and expulsion, as well as a 
discipline code that provides administrators and teachers little discretion in 
individualizing responses to particular incidents.1,3,15,20,21 Under a regime 
of zero tolerance, even low-level infractions are often met with harsh 
punishment. Research shows that such policies often have the effect of 
punishing those students who are most in need of academic or mental 
health supports because it is typically the most disadvantaged students 
who engage in rule-breaking behavior or are pushed out by schools.6,14 
Kafka1 and Devine2 explain the historical rise of zero-tolerance 
discipline policies in the context of a growing separation of the school’s 
roles as educator and as moral advisor. With zero-tolerance policies, the 
number of police in schools has grown, and the utilization of law 
enforcement officials to ensure school safety has become increasingly 
common. Policing in schools has become commonplace, particularly in 
urban schools, where metal detectors and surveillance cameras have 
become ubiquitous. In fact, the utilization of punitive approaches to school 
security has become so pervasive and widely accepted that other 
paradigms for creating a safe environment are rarely considered.2,5  
Even though the school shootings that helped legitimize zero 
tolerance took place in white suburban communities, the policies’ most 
punitive effects have been in urban, minority, and low-income schools 
such as Seacrest.18 While zero tolerance is ostensibly a “colorblind” 
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policy,22 research suggests that it has often been implemented in a 
manner that results in racial disparities.6 In practice, zero tolerance has 
been used as a mechanism to disproportionately punish the least 
successful students, who in many cases have the least motivation to obey 
school rules. In this way, zero-tolerance policies have been found to 
perpetuate a form of racial discrimination, with minority students bearing 
the brunt of increasingly higher stakes and more severe consequences.6,23 
Accordingly, schools with a lower percentage of white students have been 
found to have higher suspension rates.24,25 Even though zero-tolerance 
policies and practices disproportionately affect students of color, they have 
become pervasive characteristics of a broad cross-section of American 
schools.3  
With the rise of zero-tolerance policies, interracial conflict in schools 
has been redefined as the result of criminal-like behavior of individual 
students. Within the climate created by zero-tolerance policies, the 
understanding of interracial conflict as rooted in cultural misunderstanding 
and structures that promote racial segregation has been overshadowed by 
a framework that casts offending students as deviant and criminal. 
Increasingly, students who engage in intergroup conflict are no longer 
seen as being in need of sensitivity training or more exposure but instead 
are more likely to be treated as criminals who need to be punished. This 
transition from one paradigm to the other reflects the move away from a 
structural critique of segregation. In the forthcoming analysis of the case, it 
will become clear that a punitive paradigm that treats individual students 
directly involved in interracial conflict as criminal offenders came at the 
expense of a structural critique that treats the roots of conflict as a 
byproduct of the segregation of student groups.ii 
 
School Climate and Responses to Student Conflict 
Several studies have documented the negative impact of zero-tolerance 
policies on school climate.3,5 Strict and inflexible regulations undermine 
the close student-teacher relationships that keep schools safe.2,5 Strong, 
positive relationships between adults and students have been found to 
create safety by building a climate of trust, respect, responsibility, and 
academic engagement26-29 and by deterring misbehavior.30 
Several studies have shown that students who attend schools with 
a positive school culture have higher levels of academic engagement. In 
contrast, zero-tolerance policies have been found to undermine efforts to 
                                                          
iiAt Seacrest, the punishment and removal of the ‘assailants’ was emphasized over a 
critical analysis of the structures of the school that physically and socially segregated 
black and Asian immigrant students. 
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create a school environment that fosters academic engagement. At the 
school level, Noguera14 found that schools with low levels of academic 
engagement are more likely to employ exclusionary discipline. Similarly, in 
an ethnographic study of a school in New York City, Nolan5 found that 
exclusionary discipline practices and academic disengagement are 
mutually reinforcing. She draws particular attention to how high stakes 
testing often contributes to creating “alienating classroom experience[s] 
that play a central role in the creation of a flow of students out of 
classrooms and into the hallways, giving local educational policy makers 
cause to argue that students were ‘out of control’ and in need of being 
policed.”5(p37) Nolan demonstrates that schools under pressure to raise test 
scores are more likely to punish students who do not respond to their 
instructional practices.  
Other research has shown that conflict resolution, peer mediation, 
mentoring, increased recreational programs, positive behavioral 
interventions and supports, social and emotional supports, and restorative 
justice practices are all promising alternatives to harsh and exclusionary 
discipline.22,31 Additionally, researchers have found that encouraging 
students to voice their concerns about learning conditions at school can 
yield promising ideas for change.32,33 In this paper, we have incorporated 
student voices through interviews and focus groups to better understand 
how students were affected by Seacrest’s responses to the incident. 
 
Methodology 
As part of a larger research team, we conducted a school climate study of 
Seacrest High School in the 2010-2011 school year. Data collected were 
both quantitative and qualitative. We conducted interviews, focus groups, 
and observations, gathered administrative data, and administered a 
student survey. Participation in interviews, focus groups, and the student 
survey was voluntary. The diversity of data sources and the ability to 
compare perceptual data with observational data allowed us to triangulate 
findings.  
Because we were conducting a case study of one school, we 
sought to capture the perceptions of safety of all members of the Seacrest 
community in our data collection. The on-site research team consisted of 3 
people, and the research was carried out over a few weeks. The complete 
data set encompassed a large and representative segment of the 
Seacrest community.  
In order to include as many constituents as possible, we relied 
upon focus groups over interviews. Focus group and interview protocols 
sought to understand participants’ typical daily experiences and their 
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perceptions of safety and the learning environment at Seacrest. All staff 
were asked to participate in a focus group during a common planning 
period, and student focus groups were organized to capture students’ 
experiences in each grade level and academy. We targeted school 
leaders, specifically the principal, the security director, the deans, and 
academy leaders, for individual interviews because of their unique 
responsibility and influence within the school. Focus groups for parents 
were also organized and were conducted in participants’ native languages 
(English, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Spanish). The 24 focus groups and 
10 individual interviews lasted approximately 1 hour each and were held in 
a location convenient for the interviewee, usually their office or a 
classroom.  
During the 3-week period of on-site data collection, 26 classroom 
and 31 school-space (e.g., cafeteria, hallway) observations were carried 
out. Classroom and school-space observations lasted approximately 1 
hour each and followed a semi-structured protocol designed to capture the 
nature of staff-student and student-student interactions in various settings. 
In order to observe in as many classrooms as possible, we observed in 
each classroom once, capturing a total of 26 instructional spaces. 
Through interviews and focus groups alone, we captured 53 
teachers, 6 administrators, 15 staff members (e.g., counselors, safety 
agents), 4 service providers (e.g., after-school program directors), 35 
students, and 9 parents.  
All students were asked to complete the school climate survey 
during 1 class period. The survey included previously field-tested and 
newly designed research-based measures concerning safety, belonging, 
academic engagement, discrimination, fairness, and future aspirations. 
The student survey was translated from English into Spanish, Khmer, 
Vietnamese, and Chinese to accommodate the diversity within the student 
body. We received 428 student surveys from the approximately 700 
students enrolled at Seacrest. Through a comparison with school 
demographic data reported by the district, student survey data were 
representative of the student body in terms of race and ethnicity within a 
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Table 1. Summary of participants 









Teachers 6 1 53 
Administrators 1 1 6 
Staff (e.g., counselors, deans, 
police, etc.) 
3 6 15 
Providers (after-school, 
supplementary, etc.) 
1 1 4 
Students 9 1 35 
Student Questionnaire 
    428 
Parents 4 0 9 
The administrative and survey data were analyzed with statistical 
software to explore patterns within the student body. Data were 
disaggregated by several demographic factors, including race, gender, 
immigration status, special education status, primary language, and 
country of birth. We conducted a descriptive analysis of the data, tracking 
survey responses by student demographics. With the administrative data, 
we explored changes between the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school 
years in terms of infractions, sanctions, and attendance.  
 We initially coded the qualitative data deductively, isolating 
excerpts relevant to the school’s response to the 2009 incident. These 
sections were then inductively coded. Two of the themes which emerged 
in this process—1) the expansion of school policies and accountability 
systems and 2) the negligence of other school priorities—are explored at 
length in this paper. Coding was conducted with the assistance of Atlas.ti. 
 
Data Analysis 
Expansion of Policies and Accountability Systems 
In response to the incident between Asian and black students in the 2009-
2010 academic year, Seacrest’s administration focused on establishing a 
range of new routines and structures. These included developing new 
protocols, such as setting up a clear process to address student 
complaints, and enforcing the dress code with renewed vigor. According to 
one school administrator, the first 3 months of the year were wholly 
dedicated to such efforts: 
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In September, there was a huge focus on getting the systems in place, making sure we 
had them….We had to install metal detectors, hire security guards, and put a security 
plan in place. So getting those things into place took time….We had to see how things 
would go for the first couple of months and make sure that the issues of last year didn’t 
become an obstacle for us as we were getting started. 
 
The first step toward preventing a similar incident from occurring, 
according to school administrators, was to set up clear procedures and 
policies for security and to reinforce old policies with consistency.  
Following the incident, the school and district administration had 
come under considerable criticism for the way in which it had responded. 
As a result of this scrutiny, a new administrative team had been installed 
to manage the school. As the administrative team put its security 
measures in place, local media continued to closely scrutinize what was 
occurring at the school, even going so far as to place a reporter on site for 
an extended period during the fall. Additionally, the district was under legal 
and political pressure from the US Department of Justice and the state’s 
Human Relations Council to adopt formal policies and procedures that 
would make it less likely for incidents of interracial violence to occur again. 
Community organizations also monitored the school closely in the 
aftermath of the conflict, with one group regularly issuing complaints and 
criticisms to the local media about the superintendent’s handling of the 
issue. For all of these reasons, the school administration was under 
considerable pressure to ensure that there was concrete evidence of 
change and improvement at Seacrest.  
 By almost any estimation, the security measures adopted by 
Seacrest were costly and extensive. Fifteen sworn police officers were 
assigned to the school under the leadership of a police sergeant. A 
command and control room was established with state-of-the-art 
surveillance cameras, which allowed security personnel to monitor 
hallways and the perimeter of the school grounds. An updated metal 
detector system was installed at the school’s front door, through which 
every person entering the building was required to pass. Additionally, 
when school ended at 3:00 PM, police officers and school administrators 
were deployed to neighboring streets to ensure that students had safe 
passage to public transportation. The total cost of these measures was 
well over 2 million dollars, and the funds were expended despite the fact 
that the district was making severe cuts in other areas of its budget. 
It was impossible for the support staff, students, and teachers not to 
notice the new focus on security, considering the way it affected their 
routines at school. One staff member noted approvingly that the increase 
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in procedures and follow-through at Seacrest had substantially changed 
the atmosphere at the school: 
 
There’s a uniform discipline policy this year….I think that that sort of streamlining…has 
helped…you know, it provides some clarity….There’s a dramatic difference this year, 
even in terms of uniform enforcement of rules and stuff like that….I know it isn’t fun for 
the students, but it is best for the school….The school feels a lot more organized and 
orderly now. 
 
According to the staff members who were given some of the responsibility 
of enforcing policies, consistent enforcement and accountability 
throughout the school helped to create a work environment that many 
found supportive. Several teachers and school personnel told us that the 
new routines created a sense of order that had previously been lacking at 
the school. Many acknowledged that students may not be happy with all of 
the changes, but the perception of order lent a much-needed sense of 
legitimacy to the school after it had gained a reputation for violence 
following the incident. A staff member explained: “Now there is follow 
through and people are more comfortable to go and talk to somebody, and 
there’s a lot of people to talk to, at times, maybe too many.”  
Staff members attributed the increase in control and order not only 
to the expansion of rules and new accountability structures but also to the 
introduction of surveillance cameras throughout the building. When asked 
what she felt was the biggest change since the previous school year, a 
staff member explained, “there is no yelling in the hallway, there is not a 
lot of traffic in the hallway,” and then she suggested that the change was 
due to “the cameras.” The installation of surveillance cameras was 
frequently cited as a primary reason for increased feelings of safety at 
Seacrest. One staff member explained: “I think the climate has changed 
tremendously. Our hallways are quiet now. You don’t see any students 
walking around, cutting in the hallways. The cameras are excellent 
because there’s nowhere for the students to hide when they are cutting.” 
Another staff member noted: “The hard fact is that there are so many 
cameras in the school now. I think that does something. You know? 
Because there aren’t groups of students hiding in the hallway and in the 
stairwells.” The fact that the incident in 2009 had occurred in the hallways 
may explain why the decrease in hallway roaming took on such symbolic 
importance.  
Parents also voiced positive opinions about the measures taken by 
Seacrest in response to the incident. In a focus group, an Asian American 
parent expressed gratitude for the expansion of policies and systems at 
the school: “I want to say thank you to the school and the administrator 
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taking care of my child education, making me less worry. I like to 
acknowledge the fact that I am appreciative of the non-discrimination 
policy in the school.” Interestingly, to this parent, the security measures 
were in effect a non-discrimination policy at Seacrest. Other parents in this 
focus group also expressed approval with the increased regulations and 
security at the school. Some requested that the school be even more 
stringent in its follow-through with the students, especially when it came to 
attendance and tardiness: “I want the principal to be much stricter.” One 
grandparent, who escorted his child to and from the front door of Seacrest 
each day, felt assured of the child’s safety in school because “the police is 
guarding the area.” Another parent similarly attributed the reduction in 
incidents to the increased security: “I haven’t heard of any type of fights I 
heard before because all the school guards are out front.”  
Students’ perceptions of the school environment also seemed to 
reflect positively upon the measures taken at the school. In the 2010-2011 
academic year, 70% of the students surveyed reported feeling safe at 
Seacrest. The student body’s assessment of particular interventions is 
summarized in Figure 1 below.iii Students were asked in a free-response 
format “What actions taken by the school made you feel safe this year?” 
Twenty-five percent of students named the increase in security officers 
and 15% the installation of additional security cameras.  
                                                          
iiiStudents were able to list multiple ideas such that individual students may be counted 
within more than one category. Figure 1 depicts the most frequent responses—
categories with more than 15 respondents. 
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Figure 1. Most frequent responses to the question: “What actions 
taken by the school made you feel safe this year?”  
 
 
One student expressed her approval of the cameras in a focus group: “I 
think the cameras do keep us safe because they want to know what are 
you doing.” Another student noted that the school felt calmer in 
comparison to the previous year:  
 
Student 1: It’s more stable. You don’t see as many students cut school or in the hallway. 
 
Interviewer: There used to be a lot of kids in the hallway? 
 
Student 2: [The administration is] making new rules….Yeah, it’s good….I think there’s 
enough rules. 
 
This student drew a direct connection between the new policies and his 
feelings of safety. Similar to the school staff, students’ perceptions that 
fewer students were wandering the hallways was commonly cited as 
evidence that the level of control at Seacrest had increased. 
Not only did students report feeling safer, but the administrative 
data also reveal that the number of school-based incidents significantly 
decreased from the 2009 to the 2010 school year. While we cannot 
directly tie the new policies to this drop in the number of infractions, the 
magnitude of change suggests that the procedural and formal measures 
adopted played a salient role.  
The administrative data presented in Table 2 demonstrate the 
decrease in incidents from the 2009-2010 to the 2010-2011 school year. 
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When comparing all infractions except dress code violations in the Fall of 
2009 with the Fall of 2010, the number of reported infractions significantly 
decreased by 37%. The number of infractions related to incidents against 
persons decreased by 50%. These incidents against persons, such as 
“fighting,” “assault,” and “threats,” dropped more than other categories. 
Infractions that did not pose a threat to safety, such as “truancy,” also 
decreased but to a lesser degree. Interestingly, infractions that have no 
direct bearing on academics or feelings of safety, such as “dress code 
violation,” increased significantly. From the Fall of 2009 to the Fall of 2010, 
citations for uniform violations increased over 9000%. This increase was 
due to renewed attention to uniform violations on the part of the 
administration. Students violating the uniform policy were stopped when 
entering the building in the morning and were sent to in-school suspension 
where they often spent the entire day, unless the student was brought a 
change of clothes and then he or she could go to class after first or 
second period. Although we were told that students were given work to 
complete during in-school suspension so as not to fall behind, for the time 
we carried out our research at Seacrest, we never observed students 
doing academic work during in-house suspension (see more about the 
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Table 2. Highest incident infraction types, comparison Fall 2009 to Fall 2010iv  
Infraction Type Fall 2009 Fall 2010 Difference % 
Difference 




  34   72 -67.9 
Fighting   45   13   32 -71.1 
Simple assault   33     2   31 -93.9 
Threats   15     4   11 -73.3 
Reckless endangerment   25   19     6 -24.0 
Dress code violation     2 194 192 9600.0 
Truancy/excessive tardiness/ 
cutting class 
  25   22     3 -12.0 
Possession of beepers/pagers/ cell 
phones/other devices 
    6     7     1  16.7 
Profane/obscene language or 
gestures 
  22   16     6 -27.3 
Harassment/bullying/cyber-
bullying/intimidation 
  13   12     1   -7.7 
Instigation of or participation in 
group assaults 
    2     3     1  50.0 
 
Additionally, our observations revealed that by using security to 
enforce dress code violations, there was a substantial increase in the 
number of conflicts between students and security personnel over 
relatively minor incidents. Using the school police in this way affected the 
students’ experiences at Seacrest and significantly contributed to an 
overall climate of strained relations between staff and students at the 
school. During our time at Seacrest, we observed one student handcuffed 
when he refused to report to a dean for a dress code violation. We also 
saw students in the hallways repeatedly reproached by school safety 
agents for using cell phones or failing to remove their hats. Seacrest’s use 
of a zero-tolerance approach to discipline allowed small infractions to be 
treated with harsh consequences.  
Overall, the expansion and tightening of security policies at the 
school seemed to be effective in deterring incidents and making members 
of the school community feel safer. It should be noted that these data are 
self-reported and only include reported incidents. There is the possibility 
that school staff may have underreported incidents after the previous 
                                                          
ivThe comparison between Fall 2009 and Fall 2010 reflects the first 12 weeks of the 
school year, including the weeks in Fall 2010 when the research team was at the school 
conducting data collection. 
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year’s conflict in response to heightened public scrutiny. (Indeed, survey 
responses concerning the number of unsafe situations students are 
exposed to each week suggests that administrative data provided a low 
estimate of actual incidents.) Yet several administrators, support-staff 
members, students, parents, and teachers did identify the adoption of new 
policies and procedures as a primary reason they felt safer at Seacrest.  
The approach to school discipline and security taken at Seacrest is 
indicative of the “broken windows” approach to discipline that has been 
used to reduce crime in neighborhoods. The “broken windows” approach 
was developed by James Q. Wilson34 and called for law enforcement to 
respond quickly to relatively minor infractions as a strategy to deter major 
criminal offenses. In interviews and focus groups with school staff and 
some students, we found considerable support for this approach.  At 
Seacrest, much energy and attention was spent citing and punishing dress 
code violations (194 within the first 3 months of the school year). The logic 
behind this approach was that if students understood they could not get 
away with minor offenses like dress code violations more serious 
infractions would be avoided at the school.  
Even though the “broken windows” strategy as applied at Seacrest 
seemed to result in greater numbers of students and staff feeling safe, it is 
also clear that it contributed to tensions between students and security 
personnel and took away from a focus on academics and other school 
functions. Not all constituents felt that the new routines were positively 
effecting substantive changes at the school or getting at the causes of the 
previous year’s conflicts. One student noted an increase in security but 
went on to observe that “there’s still tension.” Another student estimated 
that there were 1 to 2 fights in the cafeteria each week. One teacher 
recounted that his classroom equipment had been stolen on multiple 
occasions, and because he had no secure place to lock it, he carried all 
his equipment to and from school each day in order to provide a 
classroom resourced with the necessary tools to study his content area. 
He dismissed the idea that the surveillance cameras were deterring 
students from misbehavior and complained that the administration was not 
responsive to offenses. Toward the end of 2010, one teacher worried that 
she was seeing an increased number of students roaming the hallway. 
She expressed concern that this might be an indicator of another incident 
to come:  
 
One of the things I worry about it that there are a lot of kids wandering the halls, and we 
do have a lot of security and help like that, but there still are a lot of kids who, I don’t 
know what they’re doing in the hall during every period….We don’t have enough security 
people maybe to keep them in place, and as the day wears on there are more and more 
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kids in the hallway, so I think that that’s what precipitated the problem last year was, you 
know, too many kids out of class roaming in the hallway….I mean, there were lots of 
problems, but you know, this issue of kids not being in the classroom, I worry about that. 
 
Interestingly, this teacher suggests that the school may need even more 
security officers to maintain order in the hallways, despite the fact that the 
large number of security officers already on staff did not seem to be an 
effective deterrent. Another teacher pointed to student initiative, instead of 
administrative or staff efforts, as the reason why the school has become 
safer after the incident. He suggested that the students were tired of the 
negative attention the school was receiving in the wake of the incident and 
that they came together to change the school culture. Similarly, 35% of 
students reported that no actions taken by the school had made them feel 
safe, and only 6% cited the strict enforcement of rules (see Figure 1 
above). These results reflect the ambivalence that was evident in the 
qualitative data: some school community members favored the increase of 
policing and surveillance, while others saw it as ineffective or irrelevant to 
their daily experience at Seacrest.  
The development of new policies at Seacrest was intended to 
reduce intergroup tensions and to make physical conflict less likely. The 
policies were created in part to meet the demands of the consent decree 
and to avoid legal culpability in the face of community groups that were 
threatening to file law suits against the school district. Under these 
pressures and intense scrutiny from the local media, it is understandable 
why the school and district adopted a strategy that narrowly focused on 
security. However, as we show in the following sections, not only did such 
a focus have a limited impact on perceptions of safety, it also completely 
overlooked other important aspects of school culture that are critical to 
school success.  
The data we collected suggest that the effectiveness of the new 
policies was largely related to their symbolic power. As Edelman explains, 
organizations often “elaborate their formal structures to create visible 
symbols of their attention to law.”35(p1567) The structures, and the 
appearance of stability they communicated to the staff, students, and 
parents at Seacrest, were intended to reestablish the school’s legitimacy 
after the incident. “Symbolic compliance”35 provides protection and 
legitimacy, 2 important and necessary conditions but, by definition, falls 
short of providing substantive change. The symbolic yet ineffective role of 
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People still do what they want to do. Those cameras are nothing but black balls on the 
ceiling. All they do is give you a heads up if there’s a problem, but most likely the problem 
has already escalated before you get to where it’s at. So the cameras really don’t do 
nothing. 
 
However, in the aftermath of the violent incidents, “symbolic compliance” 
may be all Seacrest was capable of providing.  
The overreliance on structures, routines, and systems may have 
been due to a feeling of helplessness on the part of administrators who 
work in an under-resourced and “high needs” school. One teacher 
expressed doubt that the root of misunderstandings and conflicts between 
student groups can be addressed by Seacrest: “For the school to treat 
these conflicts as something that can be dealt with through discipline, or 
through more surveillance, is kind of naïve.” Elaborating further, an 
administrator explained that the establishment of procedures for students 
to report an incident, clarifying who to go to and who is responsible for 
follow-up, was an attainable move that took little effort on his end but, he 
believed, was nonetheless significant. He explained: “That was the easy 
part to fix.” This is a clear example of symbolic compliance to legal 
requirements without substantively addressing the root of student conflict. 
Accordingly, our study suggests that symbolic compliance may be more 
likely in settings that are under-resourced and overworked, such as 
Seacrest. Further research is needed to explore the relationship between 
school demographics, resources, and symbolic compliance.  
 
Learning Neglected 
It is important to note that prior to the incident in 2009, Seacrest was 
widely regarded as an academically troubled school. According to a 2009 
school report card based on state exams, less than 20% of students had 
tested proficient in reading, and less than 10% of students had reached 
proficiency in math. In addition, almost 20% of the student body dropped 
out prior to graduation, and only 46% of students were on track to 
graduate within 4 years. Because of Seacrest’s dismal academic record, it 
was particularly noteworthy that we consistently found the effort expended 
toward creating and implementing new security and disciplinary policies 
consumed so much staff energy that strategies to promote learning and a 
positive school climate were neglected. Several of the administrators we 
interviewed openly admitted that their attention was consumed with 
deterring or quelling student incidents. As a result, they had paid little 
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The security and discipline systems were dysfunctional. We were trying to come in and 
fix those things and get those up and running. So that’s where I’ve put most of my focus 
into since the beginning of the year. I know you got to focus on classrooms and making 
sure students are learning, but my thing was how can I make it as quiet as possible. 
  
In a focus group, several administrators explained their absence from the 
classroom by the need to address what they describe as the “constant 
triage of incidents”: 
 
Interviewer: Have you been able to really get into classrooms much this year? 
 
Administrator 1: Not like we should. We’ve had so much going on….You know we’ve had 
meetings like this one….We’ve had meetings at— 
  
Administrator 2: —4-hour meetings 
 
Administrator 1: and then you know….issues that have to be dealt with so, no, we are not 
getting in like we’d really like to… 
 
. . .  
 
Administrator 1: Well, one thing I want to add is that we spend a lot of time making sure 




Administrator 1: To make sure to be proactive, take a lot of proactive measures to, so 
that we don’t have anything happen after what happened last year. So that’s another 
thing that takes a lot of our time. 
 
. . .  
 
Administrator 2: And also just the day-to-day triage. I mean things just come up, and 
safety is always key. Many days you come in here with a list of where you want to go for 
the day, but something else just jumps on top of the page. So every day. 
 
These administrators viewed the creation of security and discipline 
systems as the first priority and instruction as the second: “Now I would 
like to pick up more of the instructional leadership role because those 
climate pieces and the security of the facility, I don’t have to worry about 
that as much. They’re up and running now.” This administrator’s comment 
reflects a perspective that we heard articulated often: the goal of pursuing 
security and stability is separate and distinct from the goal of improving 
teaching and learning. Despite the fact that several studies have shown 
that school safety and student learning are inextricably linked5 and that 
academic engagement is a central part of developing a positive and safe 
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school culture,26,36 the 2 efforts were treated as though they were 
unrelated. Past research has shown that, if students are not engaged in 
academics, incidents are more likely to occur as a result of distractions 
and boredom.6 The danger created by the situation at Seacrest is that by 
focusing on policies aimed at controlling behavior without improving the 
rigor and quality of instruction, a recurring negative cycle can emerge: a 
focus on policies leads to the negligence of academic engagement; 
student disinterest in academics leads to an increase in incidents; and an 
increase in incidents leads to a change or expansion of security policy. In 
this way, security systems and structures continue to grow, while 
academic engagement and improving the quality of education students 
receive—ostensibly the primary goals of all schools—are diminished in 
importance. 
 The de-emphasis on teaching and learning was expressed by 
teachers and was observable in classrooms. Teaching was often hindered 
by the burden of paperwork that accompanied the newly expanded regime 
of security policies. This was on top of the constraints of the mandated 
curricula that the district imposed upon the school. Many teachers told us 
that the pressure put on the school to improve safety was detracting from 
their ability to focus on instruction: 
 
Teacher 1: We’re so under the microscope. We have to document so many things. 
 
Interviewer: You don’t have as much time to teach now? 
 
Teacher 2: No, I don’t. I have a feeling we’re becoming the jack of all trades and the 
master of none. There’s so many things that get put on you, requiring your attention that 
you can’t do any of them. Nothing is getting right around here. 
 
The administrators’ neglect of instructional leadership and the 
teachers’ stress from the increased mandates likely contributed to the lack 
of academic engagement among students. In a focus group, one student 
described the monotony of instruction in some classes: “You go to the 
classroom, and you do the same thing every day, and they don’t help you. 
They put the stuff on the board and say, ‘you do this.’ That’s not helping 
the students to learn nothing.” Some students perceived their teachers’ 
focus on discipline as evidence of a lack of commitment to students. One 
student advised new students at Seacrest: “You gotta learn on your 
own…some teachers don’t teach you,” and another student in the focus 
group added, “some teachers don’t put in a lot of effort.” When asked if 
teachers help if he has a problem with course work, one student 
explained, “Sometimes they…give advice, but then you go back to the 
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problem and it’s the same again….When I have a problem, I just shrug it 
off.” Such inattention to students’ academic needs was parallel to a careful 
attention to student behavior and disciplining. 
In one classroom, a teacher referred 2 students to a dean for 
discipline because they were caught looking at the National Football 
League (NFL) website. However, the teacher had not given the students 
an assignment. One dean reported that she receives about 20 referrals a 
day from teachers concerning behavioral issues. This dean estimated that 
about 17 of the 20 referrals were the result of poor teaching and a lack of 
classroom management skills and that only 3 were “serious” incidents that 
warranted her involvement.  
While the focus on discipline and safety policies may indirectly 
affect instruction and learning by leaving little time and energy for the 
classroom, the “culture of control”16 at Seacrest also had more direct 
effects on classroom life. One teacher recounted an instance in which the 
arrest of a student interfered with her teaching:  
 
I have police come in arrest one of my students in the middle of class, in the middle of 
class. They could’ve done it at the end of the period. They decided to do it in the middle 
of class so the rest of the class was shot. All the kids wanted to do was talk about the 
fight that that student has been in that ended him up getting arrested. 
 
On the other hand, some security officers suggested that teachers were 
too quick to call on safety officers for issues that they should be able to 
deal with in the classroom: “It should be a sense of classroom 
management. A lot of teachers sometimes tend to just want to call school 
police every time a child decides to be disruptive in class.” The 
involvement of security officers in addressing minor infractions (e.g., a 
student who refuses to do work in class) was initiated by several teachers. 
Once security officers are involved in responding to an incident, it is more 
likely that a student will be removed from the classroom or even arrested, 
since these are the primary and most practiced responses in the security 
officers’ toolkit. 
Students seemed to be aware of the trade-offs between security 
and academics. In a focus group, one 12th grade student asked: “Y’all 
paid…for those cameras and we don’t have books. We still don’t even 
have all our books for statistics class, like some of the books ripped up, 
we gotta share the books, like it don’t make no sense….How about you 
get us books first?....I think it was a waste of money.” The prioritization of 
safety and discipline policies was communicated clearly in the school 
leadership’s efforts, through the large sums of money expended on 
security, and by the way attention to student learning was allowed to fall to 
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the wayside. Although these policies may have provided Seacrest the 
ability to establish a reputation for control under considerable external 
pressure and scrutiny, the goal was pursued at the expense of learning. 
 
School Culture Neglected 
To a large degree, the move toward increased surveillance and control 
was rationalized as an effort to create more equitable experiences across 
the student body. It was believed that such efforts would lead to a more 
positive school culture. One administrator stated: “We have been strict 
across the board with everybody. We’ve been very, very strict across the 
board.” A staff member referred to this new emphasis as “common law” 
and explained that adults were held accountable to dole out 
consequences to students according to policy: “This is our school policy. 
You have to do it to students.” One administrator’s comments directly 
suggested that having all students experience the same consequences 
was a way of creating unity among the student body—as if ‘under one 
policy and punishment, we are all equal.’ He elaborated: “It doesn’t matter 
whether they are this or that, when you’re walking down the hallway with a 
phone, we’re going to catch you…so other children do not feel a sense of 
favoritism.” The logic behind this strategy was that the Asian-black student 
conflict could be addressed by submitting all students to the same strict 
surveillance and discipline. Through strict enforcement of the discipline 
code and security policies, it was believed that the school would become 
safer and that a sense of community would develop.  
Our data suggest that such a tactic contributed to a shared sense 
of grievance based on negative experiences among students. We found 
that the attention paid to discipline and safety policies came at the 
expense of a positive school culture. One student reflected on the way the 
surveillance cameras affected the school climate: “Well lately I haven’t 
seen conflicts between Asians and blacks, but there’s still an unsure 
feeling because some people feel like their privacy is getting invaded 
because of all the cameras and the more security and all that.” This 
student suggested that new problems had emerged with the interventions 
put in place intended to deter interracial conflict.  
Complaints about security officers’ interactions with students were 
common. One student reflected: “The police officers are always being 
rude to the kids….They’re always disrespectful and yelling in their ears.” 
When asked whether he felt safe in school, one black male student 
responded: “I’m kind of scared of police….I’m afraid like they think I’m 
doing something, that I look suspicious to them. I really, I just don’t like 
security. I really don’t.” Students recounted several instances of observing 
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other students arrested in the school building. One student spoke about a 
time the police patted down a group of boys in the gym and then 
handcuffed one. During the entrance procedure in the mornings, female 
and male students entered in separate lines and went through a metal 
detector. According to one security officer, students are also randomly 
subjected to “invasive search” in order to catch illegal drugs on the bodies 
of students, even if the metal detector does not go off. 
In an interview, one officer explained the new approach to security: 
“It was basically setting it up to run like a police department in the school, 
treating the building as a city….The hallways are the streets, the 
classrooms are the communities….The main thing first was to get some 
sense of order in here and accountability.” Accordingly, this officer 
seemed to embrace the picture of policing described by the students, a 
perspective that reinforced the idea that policing inside and outside the 
school doors had become indistinguishable. One security officer explained 
his negotiation of being placed in a school and upholding the law as a 
police officer:  
 
There’s a common respect there, I told them I will lock you up if it leads to that. That’s not 
what I want to do, and that’s usually my last resort. I’m not in the business of giving kids 
police records, but if I’m forced in a situation where I can’t, I have no leeway. I have to do 
what I have to do but for my job. It’s a very fine line. 
 
While the survey suggested that many students perceived the school to be 
safe as a result of the new security measures and discipline procedures, it 
also revealed that students did not feel Seacrest had a positive learning 
environment. Rather, for many students, the school was perceived as an 
extension or even a paradigmatic example of the “culture of control.”16  
Survey data further demonstrate students’ negative assessments of 
Seacrest’s environment. According to students’ ratings, Seacrest fell short 
on measures of fairness, belonging, and multicultural cohesion, and it only 
met minimally necessary levels of school-based supportive relationships. 
The highest ratings went to school-based supportive relationships, which 
was given 3.1 on a 4-point Likert scale, where 1 is very negative and 4 is 
very positive.  The mean of ratings for fairness was 2.8, and it was 2.6 for 
belonging. Multicultural cohesion was rated significantly lower than the 
other scales regardless of demographic characteristics, with a mean rating 
of only 2.4.  
Aside from the new security policies’ negative effects on academic 
engagement and school climate, the intensive focus on the incident and 
Seacrest’s response to it led to other educational concerns and 
community needs being overlooked and de-prioritized. Seacrest once had 
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a well-regarded culinary arts program, but during the year when security 
became the school’s top priority, the program lost resources and its 
director left the school. One administrator lamented that 2 students had 
been murdered in the previous year but that these traumatic experiences 
had been overshadowed by the efforts put toward responding to the more 
publicized Asian-black incident. 
 
Conclusion 
In the aftermath of the violent incidents between Asian and black students 
at Seacrest High School in the 2009-2010 school year, it is 
understandable that school and district administrators would have placed 
great emphasis on addressing matters related to safety, order, and 
security. Moreover, after signing a consent decree with the US 
Department of Justice and the state Department of Human Relations, 
which required the district to enact a variety of safety measures, and 
under pressure and scrutiny from local media and community groups, it 
makes sense that the district would have taken every step available to 
ensure that there would be no recurrence of violence at the school.  
A vast body of research on schooling has shown that safety is an 
essential requisite for a positive educational environment. In fact, 
education philosopher John Dewey37 and psychologist Abraham Maslow38 
have argued that violence, disorder, and threats to physical safety are 
antithetical to an environment where students can learn and develop and 
where teachers can instruct effectively.  
However, several studies have also shown that school safety is 
largely a by-product of strong positive relationships between students and 
staff29,36 and not the adoption of advanced security measures.4 In fact, as 
this study of Seacrest has shown, by placing a disproportionate amount of 
energy and attention on security issues, the school neglected other 
important elements of its larger educational goals, namely teaching and 
learning and a positive school culture.  
It is important to understand that the fragmented focus on school 
safety is not unique to Seacrest and the unusual circumstances that were 
confronting the school. Schools as complex organizations are driven by 
multiple and often competing goals. Since the advent of zero-tolerance 
policies, schools across the country have adopted a number of costly 
security measures and highly punitive discipline policies in an attempt to 
ensure safety (or the perception of safety) at the expense of other 
concerns.18 Positive perceptions of safety are not insignificant, as they are 
vital to upholding the school’s moral authority to maintain order,39 as well 
as to students’ and teachers’ abilities to focus on academics. However, 
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the effort to create safe and orderly schools increasingly has come to 
resemble the fight against crime in the larger society, and like the larger 
effort, underlying issues related to poverty, inequality, and institutional bias 
have largely been ignored.3,6  
The fact that some students and staff at Seacrest looked favorably 
upon the increase in surveillance, policing, and zero-tolerance approaches 
to discipline despite their negative effects on school culture and learning 
draws attention to how school policy not only materially affects students’ 
and staff members’ everyday lives (e.g., creating paperwork, bringing new 
and harsher punishments) but also limits the range of solutions they 
perceive as possible or effective in addressing problems at school and 
likely beyond the school doors as well. School policies have socializing 
powers and contribute to shaping the thinking of how societal problems 
should and could be addressed (e.g., through supportive versus punitive 
interventions). Certainly, the school’s tactics were first informed by the 
larger US “culture of control,”16 but the school’s role in reinforcing and 
influencing society in return must also be recognized. 
As the case of Seacrest shows, narrowing the focus of school 
improvement efforts to a singular goal can result in schools neglecting 
important aspects of the educational mission that are essential to school 
success and youth development. The alternative to a narrow focus on 
safety and security is a broad focus on the environmental conditions within 
schools that promote strong, positive relationships between educators and 
students that are essential to learning and child development. American 
education philosopher John Dewey, in writing about the conditions for 
growth, explains why a broad focus on the learning environment and 
school culture is essential. He writes:  
 
Development when it is interpreted in comparative terms, that is, with respect to the 
special traits of child and adult life, means the direction of power into special channels: 
the formation of habits involving executive skill, definiteness of interest, and specific 
objects of observation and thought….The adult must use his powers to transform the 
environment thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect student powers and keep 
them developing. Ignoring this fact leads to arrested development…37(p40)  
 
In narrowly pursuing safety or higher test scores in isolation from 
other goals that Dewey describes as essential to child development, 
schools like Seacrest invariably remain mired in failure. Cases like this 
one are reminders that safety cannot be disassociated from the broader 
mission of schools, and to the degree that they are, genuine and 
sustainable school improvement will continue to be out of reach.  
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